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THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS AND
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF WORKERS'
COMPENSATION LAW*
Richard A. Epstein**
During the nineteenth century, the nature and extent of an em-

ployer's liability for industrial accidents were the object of intense
debate, both within and beyond the legal arena." Since negligence
was widely regarded as the proper basis of liability, the require* The John A. Sibley Lecture in Law delivered at the University of Georgia School of
Law on April 6, 1982, revised and expanded for publication.
** James Parker Hall Professor of Law, University of Chicago. I would like to thank Roes
Green and Mark Holmes for their helpful research assistance in the preparation of this
Article.
I See, e.g., Thompson, Under What CircumstancesA Servant Accepts the Risk of His
Employment, 31 AM. L. REv. 82, 85-86 (1897), which contains this denunciation of the established order
I do not want my professional brethren to think for one moment that I balance the
life of a railway brakeman against the slight expense to a railway company of blocking its frogs and switches. I should be sorry to have them think that I ever was willing
to balance the life of a railway brakeman against the slight expense to a railway company of building the upper works of its bridges sufficiently high for a brakeman to
stand upon the top of his car without coming in contact with them. These are murder-machines; and the rule of judge-made law which holds the servant at all time
and under all circumstances, bound to avoid them at his peril, is a draconic rule. It is
destitute of any semblance of justice or humanity. It is cruel and wicked. It illustrates
the subserviency of the American judiciary to the great corporations... [lt puts
the wealthy capitalist, corporate or unincorporate, upon the same equality in this
respect, as that of the starving laborer, who must carry his meager dinner pail to his
employment, no matter how dangerous it may be, in order to get a little food, clothing and shelter for his suffering family.... Those who can reconcile their consciences to the cold brutality of the general rule with reference to the servant accepting the risk, are at liberty to do so; I envy neither their heads nor their hearts.
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ments of the employee's prima facie case were not the principal
legal issue. Instead, the legal battle raged over the famous trinity
of defenses: contributory negligence of the employee, assumption
of risk, and common employment. Yet more than bare theoretical
interest attached to the articulation and justification of the appropriate legal rules, for the entire area of employers' liability was
widely thought to go to the heart not only of tort law, but also of
the relationship between capital and labor in the production and
exchange of goods and services. Indeed, by virtue of its apparent
social and economic consequences, not to mention its sheer emotional importance, the problem could not in the end be contained
within the judicial system. When workers' compensation was introduced, it was done everywhere by legislation-legislation that in an
explicit fashion adopted the views of the critics, not the defenders,
of the nineteenth-century common law synthesis.
With the passage of the workers' compensation statutes, the law
of industrial accidents entered into a period of relative tranquility,
as other problems of employment relations grew more pressing.
The issues of collective bargaining, minimum wages, and employment discrimination surged to the fore. Workers' compensation
was relegated to a minor role, worthy of a problem that had been
solved. As of late, however, workers' compensation has returned to
center stage; there have been not only strains within the system,
but also sustained efforts to circumvent it. The exclusive remedy
provision, which has long kept employers insulated from the rigors
of the common law of tort, has come under mounting attack. The
ebb and flow of the law of industrial accidents is itself an object of
some interest, and the newfound concern with workers' compensation invites a critical examination of its historical antecedents and
intellectual foundations. It is to these topics that this Article is
directed.
In order to make the organization clear, the Article discusses
four different stages of development. The first concerns the common law rules of industrial accidents. The second concerns the
early employers' liability statutes for industrial accidents. The
third concerns the adoption of the modern systems of workers'
compensation. And the fourth concerns the possible sources of
their disintegration. The treatment here will not be complete on all
matters of detail. Indeed, the internal operation of the modern
workers' compensation system is quite outside the scope of this ArHeinOnline -- 16 Ga. L. Rev. 776 1981-1982

1982]

WORKERS' COMPENSATION

ticle. But I do hope that I can isolate and comment upon the central features of the history and of the debate, once thought closed,
that the subject has generated.
I. COMiON EMPLOYMENT
The law of employers' liability, both in tort and in contract, is
regarded as a child of the nineteenth century. In one sense this
view is clearly correct. The first case reports on employers' tort liability date from 1837 in England with Priestley v. Fowler,' and
from 1841 in the United States with Murray v. South Carolina
Railroad.3 In 1842 followed the landmark Massachusetts judgment
of Lemuel Shaw in Farwell v. Boston & Worcester Railroad.' Yet
the employment relationship is itself of ancient origin. Its place in
both England and America clearly precedes the industrialization of
the last half of the eighteenth century, as well as the first reported
workplace accident cases over a third of a century later. To say
that there was no law on the subject before these epic cases were
handed down would be an error. The utter dearth of cases upon
the subject indicates, clearer than any judicial opinion could proclaim, an ironclad rule of breathtaking simplicity. no employee
could ever recover from any employer for any workplace accident-period. 5 In retrospect, the legal outcome could be delicately
phrased by saying that the employer owed no duty of care to the
employee, that the employee assumed the risks of all injuries associated with his employment, or that the employer was wholly immune, not unlike the sovereign himself, from legal accountability.
Such conclusions were not stated, let alone justified. Silence said it
all: an employee should be grateful for the opportunity for gainful
employment. That he should receive any special legal protection
on top of his good fortune was quite unthinkable. In a society in
which disease and injury were rampant, and life itself fragile and
short, the result should not come as too much of a surprise. Why
150 Eng. Rep. 1030 (Ex. 1837).
26 S.C.L. (I McMul.) 385 (1841).
4 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 49 (1842).
5 It is unclear as an historical matter whether an employer could not be sued for a willful
assault upon a worker. That cause of action could proceed wholly without reference to the
employment relationship. Indeed, as the assault is deliberate, it removes the case from the
category of industrial accidents, as is generally held today. See 2A A. LARsoN, Wontum's
COMPENSATION LAW § 68.11 (1952).
2
3
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should the legal system intervene on behalf of those fortunate
enough to gain employment when there were countless others, far
worse off, who would gladly trade places with them?
This utter dearth of precedent was a point well understood by
both the English and American judges; indeed both Priestley and
Farwell rely upon the absence of any precedent as a very strong
reason why an employee could not maintain an action against an
employer for the negligence of his fellow servant in the course of
their common employment. Measured, therefore, solely by their
outcomes, the two cases appear to underscore the uncompromising
no-liability rule of the common law. No successful action for an
industrial accident had been brought prior to these suits. Afterwards, nothing had changed.
It would, however, be a great mistake to measure the institutional importance of these decisions by the failure of the immediate plaintiffs to gain relief. In fact, the decisions in question
ushered through the back door unheralded doctrinal changes that
were in their own way as important as those wrought by the workers' compensation statutes of a later day. The central point was the
recognition-hinted at in Priestley,7 but carefully developed in
Farwell8 -of the grounds on which an employee properly could sue
an employer in negligence. The central distinction taken in Farwell
was between the personal misconduct of a co-employee and the
structural decisions that marked some defect in planning or organization of the employer's business. Thus in Farwell, the employer
escaped responsibility because the only negligence alleged was that
of the employee's fellow servant in failing to operate properly a
switching device, itself a case of ordinary personal neglect. But the
court intimated that a cause of action properly lay against the employer if there had been some defect in the design of the tracks, in
the choice of equipment run on them, or in the selection and supervision of the employee." Applied in the corporate context the
rule necessarily attached liability to at least some decisions of senior officials. 10 Of all these commonplace sources of employer liabils Farwell, 45 Mass. (4 Met.) at 55, 57; Priestley, 150 Eng. Rep. at 1032.
7 150 Eng. Rep. at 1032.
8 45 Mass. (4 Met.) at 62.
9Id.
10 In

American courts this developed into a very formidable body of law about the vice-

principal rule, a subject that received extensive judicial elaboration. See, e.g., 4 C. LABArr,
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ity, there had been not a whisper in the decided cases. Yet now a
dearth of precedent, mysteriously, was no longer decisive. With
hindsight, it is fashionable to condemn both Priestley and Farwell
as vestiges of an ancient and uncaring system of employers' liability. 11 But, for better or for worse, they marked a genuine expansion of employee's rights of action as against the employer. At an
institutional level, they were plaintiffs' decisions.
What is even more remarkable about Farwell is the level of sophistication it brought to the basic problem." The decision, unlike
Shaw's unsatisfactory effort to rationalize negligence in Brown v.
Kendall," did not treat the rule of common employment in isolation. To the contrary, Shaw made every effort to defend his result
by placing it in its larger legal structure. Consistent with this view,
he first drew the correct distinction between actions brought by
strangers and those brought by persons in consensual arrangements with a defendant. The second class was a diverse mix, as it
contained actions brought not only by injured employees against
MASTER AND SRvArr 4141-665 (1913), which devotes over 500 pages to the subject. The

English development along these lines was curtailed by the important decision in Wilson v.
Merry, 1 L.I-S. & D. App. 326 (1868), which denied the employer's liability in the viceprincipal situation. The effect of the decision therefore was to extend the prohibition on
suits against the employer to situations in which supervisory personnel were involved. The
decision was widely castigated, and the reaction to it was in large measure responsible for
the passage of the Employers' Liability Act of 1880, 43 & 44 Vict., ch. 42. See Introduction
to T. SHEARMAN & A. REDFIELD, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF NEGLIGENCE (5th ed. 1898).
11See, e.g., M. Hoawrrz, TRANSFORMON OF AbwERCAN LAw 210 (1977). Horwitz argues
that Farwellrepresented a retreat from the eighteenth-century view of contract whose "normative" elements allowed judges to determine not only the existence but also the fairness of
bargains. Horwitz also states that the adoption of the common-employment rule was "thoroughly determined by the intellectual impoverishment of counsel" who refused to argue the
point as a matter of tort law, conceding that the issues in question were purely contractual.
Id. Historically the point seems false, as the well-articulated opinion of Shaw suggests that
he followed his own considerable intellectual powers and would have reached the same conclusion even if the point had been contested. The "normative" theory to which Horwitz
refers generally involved cases in which courts of equity were prepared to prevent the foreclosure of mortgages or to set aside a sale of a widow's reversion because of grossly inadequate consideration. These matters are far removed from the employment context, where,
since the employee seeks only damages, no basis for equitable jurisdiction can be found. For
an account of the eighteenth-century approach to contractual matters, see P. ATYAH, Tti
RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CoNTRAcT 167-81 (1979).
2 Lawrence Friedman regards the opinion as "brilliant," see L. Fumm, A Hisroiv OF
AMmcAN LAw 263, 414 (1973), but also as almost self-evidently wrong, see Friedman &
Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law of IndustrialAccidents, 67 COLUL. L. Rzv. 50, 51-58
(1967).
"360 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850).
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their employers, but also by passengers against common carriers
and guests against innkeepers, both common occurrences in an age
innocent of suits against employers. As regards the stranger case,
Farwell accepted the uncompromising position that vicarious liability held the employer responsible for the negligence of his servant within the scope of employment, a point of no little importance because it prevented railroads and other corporations from
ignoring the full consequences of the conduct of individual employees. 1 ' These rules were of enormous importance in all personal injury and property damage cases in the nineteenth century, and
their importance remains undiminished today.
Yet there is no doubt that Shaw was correct as a matter of principle insofar as he claimed that actions as between strangers were
governed by principles different from those applicable between
parties to some consensual arrangement. For accidents arising out
of consensual arrangements, Shaw took the position that the liability did not sound in tort, but rested, if at all, upon a promise by
the defendant employer to compensate the plaintiff employee for
the injuries sustained. In Farwell no express promise could be
found; Shaw was thereby forced to address the murky question of
the implied promise. This he did on the assumption that implied
promises were of equal dignity with express ones. Yet major obstacles stand in the way of any coherent application of this view of
the implied promise. There is no reason why express contractual
provisions on loss allocation must be constant across different
agreements of the same general class, much less across different
classes of relations.1 5 The variation in perceived conditions is often
met by a variation in contractual responses. In principle, implied
contracts must mirror that complexity, but the possibilities of doing that are sharply limited within the ordinary context of litiga14 See Epstein, The Social Consequences of Common Law Rules, 95 HARv. L. REV. 1717,
1735 (1982).
" This basic insight explains why courts in their efforts to fashion a comprehensivo code
of products liability cannot settle upon a single standard for the entire myriad of cases that
come within the domain. A strict liability rule, for example, is quite appropriate for construction defects, but wholly inappropriate for the unavoidable side effects of certain risky
activities. The point is reflected in the RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TOaTS § 402A comment k
(1965), which makes as an exception to its general strict liability rule a warning requirement
(based on negligence principles) for dangerous drugs. For a discussion of the general problem of a unified theory of liability in products cases, see R. EPSTEIN, MODERN PRODUCTS

LLIITy LAW 147-51 (1980).
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tion. To be sure, some judicial sensitivity to differences between
different types of legal relationships is feasible. Yet it is far more
difficult to show equal sensitivity to differences amongst individual
cases within a given class of legal relations.
The point is well illustrated by the common employment relationships themselves. Both Priestley's butcher and Farwell's engineer brought actions as employees against their employers. Yet a
priori there is no reason to expect that these two employment contracts, if express, would adopt the same rules of risk allocation.
One business is very much larger than the other, and the ordinary
principles of economies of scale may make it impossible for, say,
the smaller firm to institute certain compensation programs that
might be within the capabilities of a larger one. And the frequency
of accidents, or the riskiness of the work, may be an important
determinant in the level of investment in safety even in firms of
the same size."6 If, therefore, one knows only that the plaintiff is an
employee and the defendant an employer, there is insufficient information to identify the rule that properly allocates the risk of
loss, and there is no reason a priori to assume that the same rule
will work equally well in widely dissimilar contexts.
The first part of Shaw's analysis was, therefore, the least difficult, for in it Shaw had only to explain why passengers and guests
were protected by a rule that held the carrier or innkeeper respectively responsible for all losses, save those that were vis major, or
due to the act of enemy persons. Here he was aided because the
possibility of any uniform rule was very great in both these contexts, for there is very little variation in the situations of both passengers and guests, at least in comparison with that of employees.
One can, therefore, have some confidence that the proper implied
rule will fit a very large percentage of the occasions it must govern.
The real task lies in filling out the central contours of the general
rule. In this case Shaw relied upon a sophisticated view of information costs. A rule of simple negligence would make it difficult, if
not impossible, for the plaintiff to recover even for losses brought
about by, for example, an innkeeper's treachery-as where he acted in cahoots with a band of robbers. The imposition of the higher
standard of care in situations where a plaintiff, be he a passenger
or guest, was so ignorant of the possible perils that he could do
16

See text accompanying notes 86-87 infra.
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little for his own welfare instilled incentives for caution in the defendant. At the same time a limited escape hatch for visible and
extreme hazards-vis major, enemy acts-spared defendants from
liability for self-authenticating losses that (i) they did not cause,
(ii) they could not be expected to prevent, and (iii) might well have
occurred even if the plaintiff had not trusted himself into the care
of the defendant carrier or innkeeper.
There are few, then or now, who are disposed to criticize Shaw's
treatment of either the innkeeper or the carrier. But for our purpose, its very soundness, coupled with the extensive system of liability that it entailed, exposes his treatment of employers' liability
to criticism. Shaw, it must be recalled, did not take the easy course
and say that the liability rules for carriers and innkeepers could be
carried over without difficulty to employers. To the contrary, he
argued that the justifications for extensive liability in those cases
demanded a far more restrictive regime of employers' liability. As
before, as a first approximation, liability should fall on the party
with the best knowledge and ability to prevent the loss in question.
In the workplace, however, Shaw insisted that the proper person
was often the employee. The passenger and the guest may have
entrusted their safety to the care of others, but the employee
knows that for his own self-preservation he must care for himself,
for which he is equipped with knowledge of the circumstances in
the field and with the ability, alone and with peers, to exert moral
suasion and social pressure upon his fellow servants. These arguments have a strong bite in Priestley. The two servants were face
to face, and the employer was nowhere to be found. For the common precautions needed there is little that an employer can do either to instruct workers (of what they already know) or supervise
them (when they are on their own). The forces of self-preservation
may have been greater guardians of safety than any liability rule.
Nor should the incentive upon the employer be forgotten: while he
was legally off the risk, if the accident level in the firm became too
high, further wage increases would be needed to attract and hold
the best workers. 17 In addition, an employer (especially a railroad)
On this point, I think it is possible to disagree with Professor Rabin when he argues
against the fellow servant rule on the ground that it imposes no incentives upon the employer to provide a safe workplace. See Rabin, The Historical Development of the Fault
Principle: A Reinterpretation,15 GA. L. REv. 925, 940-41 (1981). Rabin's position is that
17
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would have some incentive to take care of his employees if only as
a necessary by-product of the discharge of his obligation to care for
passengers and strangers.

There is still, however, the question of the variation within the
class of employment contracts. This was presented in Farwell, as
Shaw had to decide whether the fellow servant doctrine reached
cases in which the two servants were employed in "different departments"--the point pressed by plaintiff as a reason to limit, but
not abandon, Priestley."" Yet Shaw effortlessly finessed the point
on two separate grounds. First, he noted that any effort to limit
the fellow servant doctrine to employees of the same department
required an independent account of what constituted a department. For him the administrative costs of policing the distinction

were far greater than any perceived benefit that might be derived
from its use. That consideration could also be used to argue that, if
the common-employment doctrine was wholly inappropriate for
employees of different departments, then it should be abandoned
entirely. Yet this Shaw refused to do, in part because he feared the
administrative complications that suits against employers would
entail, and in part because he thought that any additional risks
were offset by higher wages-pointing out that Farwell had received higher wages when he moved from his former job as a
mechanic to the more dangerous employment as an engineer.' 9
the employer would take additional care only if he became liable upon notification of the
danger or if he "systematically believed that careless employees were less productive workers" A third possiblity is that the less attractive conditions would make it more difficult to
attract and hold workers because of the implicit (but real) cost of greater injuries.
18 45 Mass. (4 Met.) at 52. The twists and turns of the "different department rule" are
impossible to summarize within a short space. It should be sufficient to note that Labatt
devotes about 70 pages to the issue. See 4 C. LABArr, supra note 10, at 4071-140. In one
place he writes that "while it is agreed on all hands, that, under some circumstances, a
difference in department is a ground allowing recovery, there is a radical and irreconcilable
divergence of opinions as to what the circumstances are that will, in this point of view,
exclude the defense of common employment." Id. at 4102. Posner's treatment of the issue is
a bit more cavalier. "Under the 'different department' rule, the employer was liable for the
negligence of an employee in a different department of the company from the one in which
the injured man worked." Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL SUnD. 29, 67 (1972).
No cases are cited, and his conclusion is inconsistent with Farwell, which remained heavily
influential throughout the nineteenth century.
19 45 Mass. (4 Met.) at 59. For a modem endorsement, see Posner, supra note 18, at 70.
Posner also accounts for the assumption of risk argument on the ground that most workers
are "risk preferring," id. at 71, which goes against the common assumption that most individuals are risk neutral or perhaps even risk averse. In any event the divergence of risk
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Yet here too the argument moves a bit too fast for its own good:
the wage differential may persist, but its origins are unclear. It
could be for the increased hazards of the work, but Shaw made no
effort to show that these were attributable to the conduct of fellow
servants and not to other sources, including, for example, employees of other railroads that used the common tracks. But without
this showing, the premium paid need not be tied to the employee's
waiver of the right to sue the employer for harm caused by the
fellow servant. Moreover, if the fellow servant presented an increased risk to the plaintiff, to treat the wage differential as a premium presupposes that the plaintiff's damage action against a fellow servant was not well conceived, an issue not resolved until the
case at hand. In any event some differential could well exist even if
the action were allowed on the grounds that, with hazards of litigation and calculation of damage awards, it would not make the
plaintiff whole. Still other explanations for the wage differential
are possible-it could be that the plaintiff moved to a more skilled
and valued job. Any inference from the wage differential to the
selection of the proper liability rule becomes somewhat attenuated.
The nub of the criticism of Farwell is that a gap-filling rule created by a court should not be treated as having the same force or
commanding the same respect as an express contract. Yet the
point was often missed in the cases that followed. Thus in Hutchinson v. York, Newcastle & Berwick Railway,20 the first English
case to apply the doctrine of common employment to railroads, the
distinction between harms to strangers and harms to fellow servants was again taken; and again it was asserted that contract
principles precluded the action by the servant against the employer. But the noncontractual elements of the rule show through
the decision of Baron Alderson; the servant "knew when he was
engaged in the service, that he was exposed to the risk of injury,
not only from his own want of skill or care, but also from the want
of it on the part of his fellow-servant; and he must be supposed to
have contracted on the terms that, as between himself and his
preferences among employers and employees makes it difficult to believe that a single rule is
ideal from a contractual point of view. For criticism of the Posner position, see Rabin, supra
note 17, at 940-41.
20 155 Eng. Rep. 150 (Ex. 1850).
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master, he would run this risk."" The "must be supposed to,"
however, says it all. Here there was no evidence that the terms of
the agreement were stated by the employer to the employee as a
condition of his employment. And there is no principled explanation of why the higher wage without the liability in question is necessarily preferable to a lower wage with certain forms of protection.
It is in my view a major oversimplification to urge, as does Professor Posner, that the "courts in these cases are simply enforcing the
employment contract"22 or that the common law rules vindicated
the position of the risk-preferring workers. 3 The rules of industrial
accidents may have been developed by judges who believed in freedom of contract. But the rules themselves were not contractual, at
least as explicit contracts are contractual
The obvious equivocation between implied in fact and implied in
law has always made the rule of common employment an obvious
object of attack. Thus Prosser, always the touchstone of orthodox
wisdom, has written:
The cornerstone of the common law edifice was the economic
theory that there was complete mobility of labor, that the
supply of work was unlimited, and that the workman was an
entirely free agent, under no compulsion to enter into the employment .... The economic compulsion which left him no
choice except starvation, or equally dangerous employment
elsewhere, was entirely disregarded.2'
It should be evident that these criticisms go far beyond the
proper treatment of the implied term and reach ultimate issues of
public policy. Yet while these criticisms are more fundamental,
they are also less persuasive. In particular, there is no need to
make a set of narrow assumptions about market structure and employee behavior in order to defend a rule of contractual freedom in
employment contexts. Even on utilitarian grounds, it is only necessary to show that it yields better results than the next best set of
Id. at 154.
1 See Posner, supra note 18, at 70. For a more critical view of the nineteenth-century
cases on assumption of risk and the fellow servant rule, see Schwartz, Tort Lcw and the
Economy in Nineteenth-CenturyAmerica: A Reinterpretation,90 YAtn L.J. 1717, 1769-71
(19s).
Posner, supra note 18, at 71.
W. PRossER, LAw oF ToRns 526 (4th ed. 1971).
21
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contractual implications. It would, of course, be a happy set of circumstances if knowledge of employees were perfect and the mobility of labor were wholly unimpeded. We all know the many virtues
of perfect competition in a world without transaction costs. But
the freedom of contract rule is not defensible only under such restrictive assumptions. A more complicated set of market conditions
within employment markets makes any legal rule more difficult to
defend, including one that presumptively permits actions for negligence against employers. So long as there is some mobility of labor
and some knowledge of employees, it may well be that a rule that
presumptively protects the employer from a suit is better than one
that exposes him to it as a matter of course. To take Prosser seriously, one would wonder why employers did not pay zero wages
and why they ever made any investments in safety at all.2 5 To be

sure, there was some sharp economic compulsion, but this is hardly
removed by driving employers from the marketplace. The "author"
of the compulsion was the hard conditions of life and the low standards of living from which the technological advances of the nineteenth century promised the first real hope of escape. Was it really
preferable to remain on the farm, to eke out a hostile living from
the soil, and to have no employer to sue in the event of injury or
death?
With this said, the defense of the rule of common employment
takes a more limited form. The key point is that the enormous
variation between employments makes it quite impossible for any
court to develop a set of rules that will withstand the pressures of
prolonged litigation. The ceaseless elaboration of the tort law of
industrial accidents shows how fruitless it is to think that any one
set of rules will do suitable service in the many separate conditions
to which it will have to be applied. Yet if no ideal surrogates for
contract can be developed, it is vital that the judicial rules be amenable to modification by private agreement. The rule of common
employment with its commitment to freedom of contract allowed
such modification. While transaction costs in some employment
contexts may be high, the prospects in question are not wholly
idle, as our discussion of the English Employers' Liability Act of
1880 indicates.
21 See Posner, supra note 18, at 75.
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EMPLOYERS' LLB-rrY

ACTS

The general dissatisfaction with the rule of common employment, especially in the uncompromising form it assumed in Wilson
v. Merry,2" led to its legislative repeal first in England and then in
the United States. The repeal of common employment did not,
however, usher in the modern system of workers' compensation, for
the initial response was the adoption of an intermediate position
that imposed upon the employer a qualified form of negligence liability. The first statute of this sort was the English Employers' Li-

ability Act of 1880,17 which served as the model for statutes in a
good number of American jurisdictions."
The central features of the 1880 statute can be summarized as
follows: 29 section 1 of the statute enumerated five types of circum-

1

See note 10 supra.
43 & 44 Vict., ch. 42.
23 See, e.g., Federal Employers' Liability Act, ch. 149, 35 Stat. 65 (1908) (codified as
amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-59 (1976)); Federal Employers' Liability Act, ch. 3073, 34 Stat.
232 (1906); Act of March 6, 1907, ch. 97, 1907 Cal. Stat. 119 (current version at CAL. L.
CODE §§ 2803, 2804 (West 1971)); Act of May 14, 1887, ch. 270, 1887 Mass. Acts 899 (current
version at MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 153 (West 1958)). The first of the federal statutes was
declared unconstitutional, Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463 (1908); the second was
upheld, Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1 (1911).
In full, the first two sections of the Act provide:
1. Where after the commencement of this Act personal injury is caused to a
workman

(1) By reason of any defect in the condition of the ways, works, machinery, or
plant connected with or used in the business of the employer or
(2) By reason of the negligence of any person in the service of the employer
who has any superintendence entrusted to him whilst in the exercise of such
superintendence; or
(3) By reason of negligence of any person in the service of the employer to
whose orders or directions the workman at the time of injury was bound to
conform, and did conform, where such injury resulted from his having so conformed; or
(4) By reason of the act or omission of any person in the service of the employer done or made in obedience to the rules or byelaws of the employer, or in
obedience to particular instructions given by any person delegated with the
authority of the employer in that behalf; or
(5) By reason of the negligence of any person in the service of the employer
who has the charge or control of any signal, points, locomotive engine, or train
upon a railway,
the workman, or in case the injury results in death, the legal personal representatives
of the workman, and any persons entitled in case of death, shall have the same right
of compensation and remedies against the employer as if the workman had not been a
workman of nor in the service of the employer, nor engaged in his work.
2. A workman shall not he entitled under this Act to any right of compensation or
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stances in which the traditional common law rules of liability were
displaced. The first of these dealt with defects in the condition of
ways, works, machinery, or plant; the next three dealt with cases in
which the employee acts under the supervision or direction of
other workers, thereby reversing the rule of Wilson v. Merry; and
the last was directed to situations like that in Farwell, where one
worker is injured by the "negligence of any person . . . who has

the charge or control of any signal points, locomotive engine, or
train upon a railway."30 With respect to these five categories of
cases, but to none other, the statute provided in delphic form that
the workman in case of injury, or his representative in case of
death, "shall have the same right of compensation and remedies
against the employer as if the workman had not been a workman
of nor in the service of the employer, nor engaged in his work." '
The second section of the Act then specified a set of exceptions
to the basic rules of liability contained in the first provision. The
first exception demanded that any defect in condition set out in
section 1 had to be attributable to the negligence of the employer
or his servant. This clause need not have been drafted as an exception as it was possible to incorporate the negligence requirement
into the principal section, as was done in subsections 1(2), 1(3),
and 1(5). The second exception was in fact a proviso to section 1(4)
remedy against the employer in any of the following cases; that is to say,
(1) Under sub-section one of section one, unless the defect therein mentioned

arose from, or had not been discovered or remedied owing to the negligence of
the employer, or of some person in the service of the employer, and entrusted
by him with the duty of seeing that the ways, works, machinery, or plant were
in proper condition.
(2) Under sub-section four of section one, unless the injury resulted from
some impropriety or defect in the rules, byelaws, or instructions therein mentioned; provided that where a rule or byelaw has been approved or has been
accepted as a proper rule or byelaw of one of Her Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State, or by the Board of Trade or any other department of the Govern-

ment, under or by virtue of any Act of Parliament, it shall not be deemed for
the purposes of this Act to be an improper or defective rule or byelaw.
(3) In any case where the workman knew of the defect or negligence which

caused his injury, and failed within a reasonable time to give, or cause to be
given, information thereof to the employer or some person superior to himself
in the service of the employer, unless he was aware that the employer or such
superior already knew of the said defect or negligence.
43 & 44 Vict., ch. 42.
- Id. § 1(5).
31

Id. § 1.
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that stated that no rule or bylaw should be regarded as defective if
approved by the Parliament or its agents. The last of the exceptions, and the one that caused the greatest difficulties in the construction, went to the issue of assumption of risk, as inferred from
the failure of the employee to give notice to the employer of defects of which he had knowledge and the employer did not.
Thereafter the statute set out the limited amounts of money
that could be recovered-three years' wages were a maximum; 2
the periods of time in which the actions could be brought;" the
mechanics of payment and collection;3 4 and provisions governing
the trial of suits and the notice of claim and the like.3 5
In dealing with the statutory scheme, this Article addresses one
major theme that goes to the status of employers' liability under
the statute: was it possible for the employer and employee to contract out of the statute by express agreement? This question was
raised shortly after the passage of the statute in Griffiths v. Earl of
Dudley. 6 There the decedent fell to his death in a pit accident
because of a defect in the equipment used to take miners in and
out of the pit shaft. The defect in the condition of the plant fell
squarely within section 1 of the statute, and it was attributable to
the negligence of an inspector of machinery also in the defendant's
employ. The sole defense raised against the recovery of damages
was that the employee had agreed as a condition of employment to
waive all the rights accorded him under the Employers' Liability
Act. The full terms of the agreement must be outlined, for at issue
in the case was not a simple provision that purported merely to
restore the former judge-made rules of common employment;
rather, at issue was a detailed arrangement that created its own
compensation scheme in the event of employee injury or death.
The agreement first noted that there existed prior to the passage
Limit of sum recoverable as compensation.
3. The amount of compensation recoverable under this Act shall not exceed such
sum as may be found to be equivalent to the estimated earnings, during the three
years preceding the injury, of a person in the same grade employed during those years
in the like employment and in the district in which the workman is employed at the
time of injury.
Id. § 3.
Id. §4.
Id. §5.
"Id. §§ 6-7.
36

9 Q.B.D. 357 (1882).
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of the Employers' Liability Act a benefit society that operated a
"field box." Contributions to the field box were made by levying
weekly assessments against the individual workers as a condition
of their employment; these were then matched by an equal contribution from the employer, and payments from the box were to be
made by the employer in his sound discretion for any worker who
was injured or killed "in the course of his employment."3 The details of the operation of the scheme were not revealed in the report, but there is no evidence that recovery from it depended upon
proof of the negligence of the employer or that it could be barred
by evidence of ordinary misconduct, be it by the injured party or
by his fellow servants. In sum, the structure of the system looks
very much more like that of modern workers' compensation statutes than either the restrictive common law liability rules in place
before the passage of the Employers' Liability Act or the negligence system that the Act itself instituted.
Following passage of the statute, the employer posted notice
that he expected that the old arrangement for compensation would
continue and that in order for that to be the case, all benefits
under the Act had to be waived as a condition for employment.
The notices so posted were read by the decedent, who in turn
made his regular contributions into the box, so that an agreement
by notice and conduct can be easily inferred under the ordinary
rules of contract formation. The question before the court was
whether this arrangement was barred by the statute, which had no
words to that effect, or whether the statute could be displaced by
the agreement, now express in its formation and clear in its terms.
The decision in the case, which reflected a strong and explicit
bias toward freedom of contract, was that opting out was not only
possible, but entirely proper. "There was no suggestion that the
contract was induced by fraud, or by force, or made under duress,
and it was not a naked bargain made without consideration, for the
defendant contributed an amount to the club equal to the whole
amount of contributions from the workmen."3 8 Again: "It is said
that the intention of the legislature to protect workmen against
imprudent bargains will be frustrated if contracts like this one are
allowed to stand. I should say that workmen as a rule were per-

37

Id. at 358.

" Id. at 362.
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fectly competent to make reasonable bargains for themselves."3
And last, "I think great injustice would result [if the contracts
were not respected], because the workman might obtain the benefit
of the contract for years in the form of higher wages to cover the
risk of injury, and then claim full additional compensation when
he was injured.

40

I am not ashamed to say that I agree.

Moreover, Griffiths is not the only case of this sort in the reports. Clements v. London & Northwestern Railway" presented
for judicial consideration a voluntary compensation scheme that
reads like a blueprint of the modern workers' compensation rules.
The negligence of the employer was immaterial to the question so
long as the injury was work-related; and only the employee's willful neglect or gross negligence allowed, but did not require, the society to eliminate the benefits in question. In addition, disputes
between the two were to be resolved not by judicial action, but by
arbitration between the parties.
A second feature of Clements was that the action was brought
by an infant in the service of the railroad, for whom the usual rule
allowed enforcement of the contract only if its provisions on balance were fair in their essential features.42 Here a unanimous court
of appeals-one not indisposed to protect infants43-upheld the
agreement under attack. The arguments used by Lord
Esher-itself a point of no small significance 4 4 -sound like a brief

" Id. at 363.
40 Id. at 364.
41 [1894] 2 Q.B. 482.
42Id. at 495.
There were other statutes of more limited scope that moved in the same direction, which I
cannot consider here, but which doubtless play an important part in the general evaluation
of the law of industrial accidents. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 5, 1856, no. 103, 1856 Ga. Laws 154
(repealing common employment defense as against railroad employees and allowing them to
recover if free of negligence); see also Act of Apr. 8, 1862, ch. 169, § 7, 1862 Iowa Acts 196
(to the same effect). Note that these systems that introduce negligence and contributory
negligence are, like the Employers' Liability Act, a far cry from the workers' compensation
statutes and are in any event not necessarily (or even clearly) superior to the original common law rules.
,3With Clements contrast Flower v. London & Nw. Ry., [1894] 2 Q.B. 65, where the court
refused to enforce a contract against an infant that exonerated the employer from all lability in exchange for free transport to work.
4 The significance stems from Lord Esher's role in the judicial battles over the proper
construction of the Employers' Liability Act. In opposition to Bowen, L.J., he always urged
a broad interpretation of the Act, including a narrow version of assumption of risk. Lord
Esher urged this interpretation in his powerful dissent in Thomas v. Quartermaine, 18
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for the legislative adoption of the rule in question:
If there were no such contract, he could not obtain compensation, unless by agreement with his employers, without bringing an action either in the superior court or the county court,
and in that action he would be exposed to the risk of being
unable to prove that the accident was the result of negligence
of some one for whom the company were responsible. The injuries might, for instance, have arisen from concealed defect
of machinery not known to the company, or by pure accident
not brought about by any negligence on the part of the company's servants. The burden of proving that it was otherwise
would have been on the plaintiff, and that is a burden which
often cannot be supported. Even if the plaintiff were successful in shewing this and obtained judgment, and the defendants had to pay his costs, it is a matter of common knowledge that the plaintiff would have to incur extra costs beyond
those he would recover. Such extra costs would have to be
paid out of the damages which he would recover; and we all
know that in a majority of the cases in which only small damages are recovered those damages are seriously encroached on
in meeting the extra costs.
The risk of non-success owing to difficulty of proof, and the
risk of obtaining but small advantage from a successful action,
are both obviated by this agreement, under which, even if it is
clear that there is no legal claim which could be enforced
against the company, he is still entitled to compensation.4e
The bargain in question was not only expressly made, but, given
what the employee obtained as well as what he surrendered, was
fair in all its circumstances. That result, it might be added, could
have been reached by another route, the nondiscrimination principle. The infant was admitted to the association on the same terms
as adult members, so that he received the protection afforded all
those competent to bargain for themselves. As in Griffiths a volunQ.B.D. 685 (1887), and his majority opinion in Yarmouth v. France, 19 Q.B.D. 647 (1887).
He also took a very broad view of what counted as a product defect. See Walsh v. Whitoeloy,
21 Q.B.D. 371 (1888), discussed at text accompanying notes 53-57 infru. The central point is
that Esher did not question the validity of the explicit contractual arrangements although
he was hostile to the assumption of risk defense.
45 Clements, (1894] 2 Q.B. at 489-90; see also note 57 infra.
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tary organization rejected both the common-employment rule of
the common law and the statutory negligence rules designed to replace it. At some considerable cost the private parties instituted
instead a full-fledged antecedent to the workers' compensation
rules.
The pattern revealed in both Griffiths and Clements is important for what it says about the ability of the courts to determine
the efficient provisions in the absence of express agreements. Professor Posner, in his examination of industrial accidents, properly
observed that some limited evidence of the efficiency of common
law rules can be found in the failure of parties to contract out from
them. As regards the rules of assumption of risk and common employment, he found no evidence in the cases of contracting out in
the American context.' 6 The English experience suggests quite otherwise. Yet here it is important to have some sense of the frequency and distribution of the voluntary movement to workers'
compensation. The plans themselves come from two industries-railroads and mining-where the rate of industrial accidents
relative, say, to retailing, would be quite high. In both cases the
plans had a finished, comprehensive look that suggests that they
were not some isolated peculiarity but the product of a gradual
and perhaps widespread trend. A recent unpublished paper by
Veljanowski of the London School of Economics provides some indication that the plans themselves had, at least in the collieries,
broad adoption.47 He notes that something under twenty-five percent of the mines had such plans in force and that these were concentrated in Lancashire, where mining was the most dangerous and
the need for some positive response to the general question of accidents was most pressing.'8 One possible way to interpret his data is
as evidence that the compensation programs were generally supe-

48 Posner, supra note 18, at 74. In his Article, however, he notes, but without references:
"Evidently it was the practice of large employers, such as railroads, to provide medical
treatment to injured employees free of charge and to compensate them, during a limited
period of disability, for lost wages; in exchange the employee would agree not to bring a tort
action." Id. at 83. If the agreements in question were entered into before the accident, then
they look like the adoption, perhaps informal, of a workers' compensation system; if after
the accident, they look like the settlement of a tort case. The differences are not explored by
Posner.
47 See C. Veljanowski, An Economic Analysis of Employer Liability (1980) (unpublished
manuscript) (available in University of Chicago Law School Library).
43

Id.
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rior to the common law rules, but that the costs of their introduction were such that they were adopted only in those places where
they were most needed. In this regard the great contribution of the
English common law judges in response to the Employers' Liability
Act was not to erect obstacles that limited contractual freedom.
Both plans presented to the courts provided the worker with a
quid pro quo for the release of his rights under the Act that was
not simply buried into the wage as part of an ineffable premium.
Whether the courts would have gone the full extreme and allowed
the contract defense without the substitute program must remain
something of an open question. 0 What can be said with confidence
is only that in many circumstances the common law rules were inferior to the contractual alternatives.
Why should this be so? Here it is instructive to look at the
points raised by Lord Esher in Clements, for they represent a critique of the Employers' Liability Act that in large measure applied
with equal force to the common law rules that his points had modified. The original coverage provisions contained in section 1 of the
Act may have appeared at first glance to sweep within the statute
virtually all industrial accidents. But actually, in what in retrospect seem odd, if not indefensible, decisions, the separate heads
involved were treated as limitations upon the rights of employees
that could be triggered under the Act. A few illustrations make the
basic point. First, in McGiffin v. Palmer's Shipbuilding & Iron
Co.,"1 the decedent was killed when a car containing a heated ball
overturned and fell upon him while he was pushing it along a
track. The track was obstructed by a piece of material used to line
a furnace. The claim for damages under the Employers' Liability
Act was denied on grounds that a "defect in the condition of the
way" was not so broad an expression as to cover cases of obstruction, but reached only those in which the tracks themselves were of
1, Note that the American statutes on the subject did have express prohibitions on con.
tracting out. See, e.g., Federal Employers' Liability Act, ch. 149, § 5, 35 Stat. 65, 66 (1908);
Federal Employers' Liability Act, ch. 3073, § 3, 34 Stat. 232 (1906); Act of May 14, 1887, ch.
270, § 4, 1887 Mass. Acts 899.
10 The quid pro quo has loomed large in the American constitutional treatment of workers' compensation. See, e.g., New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917), which in
part upheld the statute because of the quid pro quo (in the form of the exclusive remedy
provision) received by the employer.
5- 10 Q.B.D. 5 (1882).
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defective manufacture or repair, and perhaps others in which they
were rendered slippery with ice. 52 It is difficult to think of a principled reason why the Act should be extended to one class of defects
while withheld from another. Even if it is objected that the innocent words of a statute were construed in unintended ways that
denied the recovery, it still remains true that the defect and negligence language functioned as words of limitation as well as those of
entitlement. Marginal adjustments in their meaning could serve to
defeat ordinary expectations in ordinary cases.
Walsh v. Whiteley illustrates the same point.5 3 The plaintiff's
job required him to place a band upon the moving wheel of a carding machine. The wheel itself contained holes in order to render it
lighter and therefore susceptible to easier motion. While operating
the machine, the plaintiff caught his thumb in one of the holes.
Recovery was denied-Lord Esher dissenting-after an exhaustive
discussion of the nature of and relationship between danger, defect, and negligence, with the majority taking the view that if the
best possible machines were regarded as "defective," the term
would be drained of all content in the law.' Lord Esher's dissent
stressed that the dangerous condition of the machine necessarily
made it defective.5 5 The discussion itself is not dissimilar from that
taking place today in connection with the modern law of products
liability, where the treatment of the issue, with the passing of the
open and obvious defect test, is as troublesome as it was nearly one
hundred years ago.5 8 But the case neatly illustrates the perils of
negligence litigation, even where there is no systematic bias in the
administration of the Act or ineptitude by the judges charged with
7
its construction.1
A similar message comes up, moreover, when one deals with the

"Id. at 8-10.
21 Q.B.D. 371 (1888).
"Id. at 378-80.
Id. at 375-76.
For the modern rejection of that defense, see Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 348
N.E.2d 571, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1976), which I have criticized, see R.Epsmr4, supra note 15,
at 144-45.
" The same analysis, again at the constitutional level, was conducted in connection with
the Supreme Court's analysis of the Price-Anderson Act. The quick and reliable remedy
provided by the statute was held preferable to the uncertain rights of claimants at common
law, even with the maximum cap on damages that the statute provided. See Duke Power
Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 88 (1978).
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treatment of defenses under the statute. Here it is quite clear that
the draftsman himself was notoriously opaque in his specification
of the consequences of a breach within the first section. Its specification is wholly negative: the workman is not to be treated as a
workman but as someone else. The question then is: Whom? One
possibility is that the workman could be treated as a stranger, but
this would be odd because typically he is injured on the premises
of the employer. Another possibility is to say that stripped of his
identity as a workman he could be regarded as a trespasser, who
would in consequence receive, if anything, less protection than he
did before the passage of the Act.58 In truth the appropriate standard appears to be that of a business invitee. But to put the point
in this manner only demands the further question: what duties are
owed here? It was this point that led to what is perhaps the most
famous dispute under the Act, the extent to which it preserved or
created a defense of assumption of risk for the employer. In
Thomas v. Quartermaine5 9 Bowen, L.J., in a powerful opinion, vir-

tually read the defense out of the Act by allowing the employer a
directed verdict whenever the worker continued on the job after he
had knowledge of the condition that caused the injury. In my view
the construction of the statute offered by Lord Esher was on balance preferable, as section 2(3) deals expressly with the matter, 0
rendering it unnecessary to draw implications about the proper
treatment of the issue from the other portions of the statute. The
1 he was able to do an end
very next year, in Yarmouth v. France,"
run around Thomas v. Quartermaine,and his views were eventually adopted by the House of Lords in Smith v. Baker & Sons.2
Yet even here it must be remembered that Esher's position did not
bar assumption of risk in cases brought under the Employers' Liability Act, but only left the matter to the discretion of the jury. It
is another instance in which general legislation was unable to elim" For the limited protection afforded trespassers in English law, see Robert Addle & Sons
(Collieries) v. Dumbreck, 1929 A.C. 358.
51 18 Q.B.D. 685 (1887).
10 This is also the opinion expressed by Francis Bohlen in his classical treatment of assumption of risk. See Bohlen, Voluntary Assumption of Risk, 20 HARV. L. REv. 91, 100
(1906).
61 19 Q.B.D. 647 (1888), which, as Bohlen notes, was not followed in America. Bohlen,
supra note 60, at 97 n.1.
62 1891 A.C. 325.
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inate the great degree of factual uncertainty in individual accident
cases. The prolonged and heated debate over assumption of risk
affords yet another explanation of why individual workers were
well advised to abandon their rights under the Employers' Liability Act in order to secure the relatively fixed and certain benefits
that the alternative voluntary plans afforded. While the common
law rule of common employment could be subject to powerful criticism, the same could be said of the Employers' Liability Act that
replaced it.
III.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

AcT

OF

1897

A. The Act
The next stage in our history is concerned with the introduction
of the modern workers' compensation statutes. Here too the developments in England were in advance of those in America, and the
language of its statute-the Workmen's Compensation Act of
189768 -- in many ways served as the model for the subsequent
American statutes. To understand the strengths and weaknesses of
this statute, it is important to view it not in isolation, but in comparison to the earlier Employers' Liability Act, which it supplanted. Here several points of contrast between the two enactments merit special attention. The first of these goes to the basic
coverage formula; the second to the status of contracting out under
the statute; and the third to an issue that could not have arisen
before the adoption of workers' compensation-the preservation of
tort actions, whether against the employer or against some third
party not covered by the Act.
On the matter of coverage it will be recalled that the Employers'
Liability Act did two things: first, it kept a general negligence standard, and second, it identified certain particular classes of injuries
covered by the statute. The newer statute took a very different approach to the basic coverage question. Negligence was removed as
a condition of liability; and the particular types of injuries were
replaced with a single comprehensive formula still in use today
that refers only to "personal injury by accident arising out of and
in the course of employment."" As drafted, the statute did not ap"' 60 & 61 Vict., ch. 37.

Id. § 1(1).
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ply to all forms of employment, but only to work "in or about a
railway, factory, mine, quarry or engineering work, and to [construction of buildings],"6 5 leaving, it appears, ordinary retail personnel and household servants, for example, outside its purview.
The various defenses that might have been available at common
law or under the Employers' Liability Act were also swept away,
for once the injury came within the statute, the employer was liable, except for a mandatory disallowance in cases in which it was
proved that the injury to a workman was attributable to "the serious and wilful misconduct of that workman." 88 For the trades and
occupations covered, we have in essence the modern system of
workers' compensation.
The second feature of especial importance in the Act was its
treatment of contracting out. The gap in the Employers' Liability
Act was filled by a detailed scheme that controlled every aspect of
the process. Contracting out was allowed, in principle, but heavily
regulated in fact. One condition was that the contract in question
must be "on the whole not less favorable to the general body of the
6' 7
workmen and their dependents than the provisions of this Act.
For another, the scheme in question could only be put in place
after certification by the "Registrar of Friendly Societies," after
opportunity to hear from both employer and workmen.6 8 The certification in question was for a minimum five-year period, but it was
subject to revocation if, upon examination of complaints, 9 the
plan was found in its administration to have fallen below the required standards and no steps were taken within a reasonable period of time to correct the defects.7 0 In addition, it was no longer
possible to require "workmen to join the scheme as a condition of
'7 1
their hiring.
Last, the statute did not eliminate the common law of tort
against the employer. "When the injury was caused by the personal negligence or wilful act of the employer, or of some person
for whose act or default the employer is responsible," the worker

65 Id. § 7(1).
Id. § 1(2)(c).

- Id. § 3(1).
" Id.
" Id. § 3(2).
70

Id. § 3(4).

71

Id. § 3(3).
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had the option against the employer to "take the same proceedings
as were open to him before the commencement of this
Act '" 7 2 -which presumably covers both common law actions and
suits under the Employers' Liability Act-even though he could
not thereby obtain a dual recovery. That option was made enormously attractive to the employee. If he chose his tort suit against
the employer and lost, he could still, if the facts disclosed so warranted, receive his compensation benefits, less only the employer's
costs of defense in the original tort action. The action against the
third party was on somewhat less attractive terms, as the worker
was forced to an election between the tort action against the third
party and his compensation claim against the employer.7 Matters
were made more complex as the employer himself, if required to
pay compensation under the Act, could receive indemnification
against the third party, although not it appears for the full extent
of the tort damages.7 4
As drafted, the 1897 statute answered the question left open
under the Employers' Liability Act. The quid pro quo given the
worker for a release from the statute could not be a simple increase
in wages: some substitute disability benefit was required. Yet here
the remaining provisions of the statute frustrated the voluntary
plans. Note for example that the plans in both Griffiths and Clements had to fail because both required all employees to contribute to the plan as a condition of employment. Prohibiting the employer from insisting upon uniformity was a crippling blow to the
voluntary plans. The risk of adverse selection by employees against
the firm was greatly increased, as individual workers were able to
trade on their personal knowledge in deciding whether to opt in or
out. Administrative costs were likewise pushed upward, as the employer had to absorb the costs of running two separate plans. All
the while, the employer ran the risk that its plan would be struck
down after complaint, leaving utterly undetermined the status of
the contributions previously made to the plan and the payouts

2 Id. § 1(2)(b).
- Id. § 6.

7"Id. Suits of this sort were relatively infrequent given the restrictive view of products
liability law. See text accompanying notes 88-91 infra. And the larger question of coordination can be solved in a wide variety of other ways today, since the rules of comparative
negligence permit many separate parties to share in the losses under, of course, widely expanded liability rules. See note 98 infra.
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under it-a point that weighed heavily on Field, J., in Griffiths.7
Difficulties were further compounded as the plans were not s.lfexecuting, but required the employer to obtain a prior approval at
a hearing at which all opponents to the plan could protest. No voluntary organization could thrive under a set of external regulations
wholly inconsistent with its informal modus operandi. In a very
short time, the statutory protections overwhelmed the voluntary
norm. What little litigation occurs under the 1897 statute (and its
successors) is directed to the liquidation of the voluntary plans.7
The Compensation Bargain
How then could the workers' compensation programs succeed?
The answer requires us to address the important question of what
consequences follow once a given set of injuries-here industrial
accidents-is effectively removed from the market. The regulation
is a barrier against the voluntary ideal. But its costs cannot be determined solely from knowledge of its existence. In addition, we
must know the size of the deviations from the voluntary norm demanded by the compulsory scheme. The earlier history of the voluntary plans under the English Employers' Liability Act is evidence that in some critical situations workers' compensation better
approximated the consensual norm than the common law rules of
negligence, with their complex baggage of contributory negligence,
fellow servant, and assumption of risk. At the structural level, the
costs of the mandatory imposition may well have been low, for it
only adopted a pattern already in widespread use.
In this connection the basic structure of the bargain was well
understood with the passage of the Act. The broad coverage
formula eliminated the need to determine negligence on both sides
and assumption of risk-all inquiries with a high degree of uncertainty. In exchange for the broad coverage formula, the workman
received a level of compensation that, by design, left him worse off
than if the injury itself had never taken place. The low levels of
the benefits doubtless proved nettlesome to workers after injuries.
But to concentrate on that point is to miss the central role. First,
low damages help keep down the overall costs of the plan, which
will induce employers to continue to hire labor. Second, low bene-

B.

75

See text accompanying note 40 supra.

7

See, e.g., Howarth v. Andrew Knowles & Sons, [19131 3 K.B. 675.
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fits help prevent fraud against the plan, as there is less to gain by
pretending that an injury, or its consequences, is work-related.
Third, the low awards create additional incentives upon the worker
for self-protection and therefore act as an implicit substitute for
assumption of risk and contributory negligence.
The question of incentives deserves a fuller discussion. In particular, it is instructive to compare the incentives created by the compensation system with those that are found under the negligence
regime in place around 1900-a system in which negligence was
required to state a cause of action and contributory negligence was
treated as a complete bar. One defense of the negligence system on
efficiency grounds, elaborated by Landes and Posner, is that it
places the full costs of an accident on both parties to the transaction, here assumed to be both rational and self-interested actors.7
As I understand the argument, it looks first to the position of the
defendant and then to that of the plaintiff. Within the workplace
the employer will take due care because he knows that the employee (in order to recover damages) will also take good care, lest
his action be barred. If, therefore, the employer does not, he will be
forced to bear the full loss, for which, by definition, cost effective
precautions are a cheaper substitute. Now once the employee
knows that the employer will take care, he too will take care: by
definition his costs of avoidance are less than the full costs of injury that would otherwise be visited upon him. In one sense the
theory is very odd, for as a first approximation it predicts that
while there will be accidents (i.e., those not worth avoiding), there
will not be negligence. As that conclusion is falsified by the most
commonplace experience, this theory can be salvaged, if at all, only
by noting that parties make certain errors in the setting of the approximate standard of care, or, in the alternative, rely on escaping
78
detection from the legal system.

' Landes & Posner, The PositiveEconomic Theory of Tort Law, 15 GA. L. Rsv. 851, 88083 (1981); Landes & Posner, Joint and Multiple Tortfeasors: An Economic Analysis, 9 J.
LEGAL STUD. 517 (1980). Note that Landes and Posner do not explicitly consider the case of
employer and employee. But if they are correct in the general view that the tort law mirrors
the types of allocation schemes that parties would choose if transaction costs were low, then
their theories should predict contracts that use negligence and contributory negligence to
allocate risk, and not the compensation system.
78 See Landes & Posner, The Positive Economic Theory of Tort Law, supra note 77, at
879-80 (addressing the question of deviations).
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Once this point is acknowledged, however, the entire theory
breaks down, for it no longer can be claimed that both employer
and employee will act on the assumption that the other side will
not be negligent-or even erroneously not found to be such. We
know it; they will know it too, both in the abstract and on the
strength of their personal experience. Everywhere there can be evidence of negligence, whether in the condition of the equipment or
in the design of the plant. At this point each party will no longer
act as though he alone will be responsible for the harm; instead,
each will take into account the possibility that the conduct of the
other will be culpable and thereby reduce the costs of his negligence. Now both parties will, if rational, assume that they will have
to bear only a part of the costs of their own negligence. The employer may choose, therefore, to take less than appropriate care on
the expectation that the worker will be negligent; the worker may
adopt the same attitude in the hope that he will escape detection
and the employer will be found negligent. We have a noncooperative strategic game in which optimal outcomes are hard to
achieve. As each party never faces the full costs of his own neglect,
the incentives under the common law rules can no longer be ideal.
We are thus back to the very situation upon which workers'
compensation rests. There is no way to have ideal incentives on
both parties at the same time so long as the system is so constrained that once the accident occurs, the set of possible outcomes
is limited to transfer payments from employer to employee. It is,
therefore, no objection to workers' compensation that it does not
make both employers and employees face the full costs of the accidents they create, because this objection is valid against every conceivable alternative, including the negligence system. That this was
understood intuitively before workers' compensation seems evident, as assumption of risk-in which cost-effectiveness is irrelevant-played a far greater place in workplace accidents than contributory negligence.7 9 For all their differences, the assumption of

risk defense and the workers' compensation rules share the explicit
rejection of the fine tuning through reasonableness necessary to
make negligence rules work. In truth, reasonableness rules are too
complicated to be attractive in any consensual situation. It is always more difficult to measure inputs than to determine outputs.
7

See Rabin, supra note 17, at 939, 947.
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Landes and Posner do suggest that a decrease in information costs
makes the evaluation of inputs cheaper today than it once was."
Factually, this assumption seems quite wrong, as the procedures
for adjudication are far more complex today than they were at the
turn of the century, especially within the American context. Even
if it were true, that assumption also makes it possible to monitor
outputs more cheaply than before and cannot of itself generate a
preference for the input-based negligence rule. Workers' compensation rules are in most instances a closer approximation to the
consensual ideal than the-negligence rules to which they are opposed. The test of efficiency is what the market "would have" demanded were transaction costs low. By that standard negligence is
an inefficient system, notwithstanding the flawed theoretical arguments offered in its support.
C. The InstitutionalFramework
The implicit logic of this critique of negligence and qualified defense of the compensation system is better revealed when the compensation rules are set against a broader background of contract
and tort principles. Here it is necessary to discuss in some detail
two separate doctrinal lines: first, the restrictive awards for damages in contract cases under the rule in Hadley v. Baxendalef' and
second, the operation of the general privity limitation as it applies
to products liability actions. For these purposes, moreover, the
nineteenth-century English and American law can be treated as a
piece, as the differences between them are small and unimportant,
notwithstanding the major divergence that has come to characterize the two systems in the twentieth century.
1. Hadley v. Baxendale. The rule in Hadley v. Baxendale marries the broad standard of strict liability for breach of contract to a
narrow principle of damages. That point is evident on the facts of
Hadley itself, as the plaintiff was denied the recovery for lost profits that resulted from the defendant carrier's failure to deliver a
needed shaft to the plaintiff's mill. The linkage between stringent
rules of liability and limited rules of damages has often been regarded as an oddity. 2 In my view the two doctrines fit together
'o

Landes & Posner, The Positive Economic Theory of Tort Law, supra note 77, at 875.
156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854).
See Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract, 70 COLU. L. REv. 1145, 1216
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hand in glove. In part the secret of their success lies in the discussion of the issue by Mayne in his classical treatment of damages:
[I]n matter of contract, the damages to which a party is liable
for its breach ought to be in proportion to the benefit he is to
receive from its performance. Now this benefit, the consideration for his promise, is always measured by the primary and
intrinsic worth of the thing to be given for it, not by the ultimate profit which the party receiving it hopes to make when
he has got it.55
There is, in a word, no presumption that either expectation or
consequential damages are recoverable for breach of contract. In
tort suits against strangers, they are appropriate; the defendant
has internalized all the benefits, so too should he bear all the costs.
But as benefits under a contract are shared, so too we can expect
costs to be shared, as the parties will arrange their affairs in ways
that maximize their joint profits and use price adjustments to
match the residual risks assigned to each party.
With damages below losses, why then should the defendant be
left a large and expensive "out" on liability? The strict liability
rule clarifies the conditions of breach; the elimination of consequential damages reduces the premium needed by the defendant,
and the built-in shortfall that falls upon the plaintiff gives him a
stronger incentive to mitigate losses than any legal requirement to
do so, with its attendant factual uncertainty. A combination of'
strict liability with limited damages acts like a settlement of a case
before the breach, to be applied after its occurrence. The attractiveness of the general rule is confirmed by the numerous explicit
contracts that reach the same general position-strict liability, liquidated damage clauses, no consequential damages, repair and replacement only-and that are today the subject of so much
84

litigation.

The point about Hadley v. Baxendale, and the regime of con(1970) (discussing restrictive principles of law of contract, after which the author concludes:
"All in all, our system of legal remedies for breach of contract, heavily influenced by the
economic philosophy of free enterprise, has shown a marked solicitude for men who do not
keep their promises."); see also G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974).
J. MAYNE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES 29 (1856).
J'
See, e.g., Ebasco Servs., Inc. v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., '160 F. Supp. 163 (E.D.
Pa. 1978).
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tract damages it presupposes, is not a digression, but is central to
the explanation of the success of workers' compensation systems.
There is in the literature a common refrain that insists that the
general principles of contractual freedom should not apply to cases
of personal injury: mistakes of information, misperception of the
risk, and the dominant position of the employer are all said to preclude this happy development. Indeed it is typically said that the
compensation system is needed precisely to respond to these
problems. 5 But why assume the worst? As the agreements in Griffiths and Clements suggest, workers' compensation is often the
market response to the accident question. In so doing, voluntary
systems of workers' compensation adopt the very same strategy for
allocation of losses that Hadley v. Baxendale adopts in commercial
settings. The "arising out of and in the course of employment" requirement is a strict liability provision, analogous to the strict definition of breach of contract. The limitation of damages to some
multiple of the weekly or annual wage is a prohibition against full
tort recovery parallel to the contractual prohibitions against consequential damages or lost profits so routinely found in the negotiated agreements. The subject matter of the risk may be important-as human life is more important than lost profits. But it
does not follow under conditions of scarcity that the best possible
strategy for the minimization of loss must therefore change. No
perfect rule is possible, so the decisive question is what rule has
the fewest flaws. From this it follows that the great secret for success of the workers' compensation system lay not in its vaunted,
coercive original compulsion, but in the fact that it followed the
very pattern of risk distribution that both historical experience
and general theory of contract law indicated would best minimize
the risks in question. The repeated references to the workers' corn-

" See, e.g., 1 A.

LARSON,

supra note 5, § 2.20, where the compensation system is said to

rest upon a rejection of both "an individualistic moral code" and a system that provides
workers with general welfare payments in the form of "county relief" or a "direct handout."

See also Henderson, Should Workmen's Compensation Be Extended to Nonoccupational
Injuries?, 48 TmX. L. Rav. 117 (1969). The adoption of expansive coverage rules is acceptable only if we view the compensation system as having the function of compensation after
the fact. When loss minimization is regarded as one goal of the system, that view must be
altered. Thus one reason why nonoccupational injuries are not covered is the distinct possibility that individual workers with a conservative lifestyle will be forced to subsidize those
with a taste for risk. With the work-relatedness criterion in place, this implicit, but unwanted, transfer will be less likely to occur.
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pensation bargain have more substance than rhetoric. As with the
rule of common employment, the proposition should be qualified,
for it may well be that the variation within the class of the employer-employee relationship is such that a single pattern of compensation does not work well in all instances." But if the structure
of workers' compensation is best attuned to firms with dangerous
employments, then the fit is apt to be best where it is most important. And if, as is usually the case, the statutes themselves are all
brought into play with plants above a certain size, the fit is still
improved, as those businesses that are too small to justify the fixed
investment in the workers' compensation system are excluded from
its operation.8 7 The contractual norm thus accounts for the regulatory success.
2. The Privity Limitation. The second of the major institutional
features of the workers' compensation system is the privity limitation. This limitation provides that an injured plaintiff can sue a
defendant responsible for the manufacture or sale of a defective
product only if the two parties are directly bound to each other by
contract.8 ' Let an intermediate party be introduced-e.g., a retailer
between a manufacturer and consumer-and the plaintiff's case
need not vanish in its entirety, but it automatically will be redirected against the party with whom the plaintiff has immediate
contractual arrangements. The privity limitation has uniformly
been jettisoned in the physical injury cases, 89 even though it continues to retain some strength in cases of commercial loss.90 It is
said that the privity limitation is, first, productive of massive injustice in that it insulates manufacturers from ultimate consumers
and, second, a source of great administrative costs in that it requires an elaborate network of contract actions in which the ability
to reach the ultimate defendant may be limited by insolvency, contractual defenses, statutes of limitations; or jurisdictional difficulties.9 1 The standard view on privity is so well entrenched that it
" See text

accompanying notes 15-16 supra.

87 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 34-9-2 (1982) (inapplicability of workers' compensation stat-

utes to plants with fewer than three employees).

" For the limitation's original statement, see Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402
(Ex. 1842).
89 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
90 See, e.g., Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 673 F.2d 951 (7th Cir. 1982).
"

See Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69
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might seem idle to say a kind word in its behalf, but in order to
understand the successful operation of the workers' compensation
system in its formative years, it is necessary to do just that.
The general attack on the privity limitation rests on an important error of undergeneralization. The typical cases in which the
issue is raised involve ordinary consumer goods sold at retail. This
will include the famous belladonna of Thomas v. Winchester," or
93
the defective wooden wheel of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.
Within this context the privity doctrine is quite unappealing because the immediate seller is typically a passive conduit of a product that is designed and prepared by others. Why, therefore,
should the soundness of the product be litigated in a suit brought
against the defendant who is least responsible for its merits? It is
just another variation on the familiar theme that we do not shoot
the messenger because he brings the bad news.
For these purposes we can assume that this limited critique of
the privity doctrine is wholly sound.9 4 The important question is
how well does it carry over to the ordinary workplace accident.
Here the key point of difference is that the employer is a very different intermediary from a wholesaler or even a retailer. For one
thing, the employer himself is always within the jurisdiction; for
another, he has had and retains direct and immediate control over
all that is used upon his premises. It is the rare machine tool that
is simply uncrated and placed into operation without customization or maintenance. It is the rare employer who is a mere conduit
of goods produced by others. Within this setting there is an enormous advantage in concentrating the litigation over industrial accidents against the employer. There is but a single defendant in the
ordinary action. The elimination of peripheral parties reduces administrative costs dramatically. Targeting the action against the
employer reorients the structure of the basic action on a host of
important substantive issues. All the modern difficulties in establishing the identity of a supplier of a defective product or component part are gone. 5 The questions of causal intervention and
YALE
9

L.J. 1099 (1960).

6 N.Y. 397 (1852).

- 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
" For a more extended statement of my own views, which does not address the point
made here, see R. EPSTnN, supra note 15, at 9-24.
" See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr.
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product modification, ever recurrent in modern product liability
actions, are virtually eliminated by the absence of intermediate
parties. Whatever the appropriate liability regime for industrial accidents, the system operates better when the proper defendant is
the immediate employer and not some remote party to the case.
Thus the privity rule makes sense no matter whether the relationship between employer and employee is governed by common law
negligence or compensation rules. If we could ask what network of
contracts between these parties would emerge if transaction costs
were zero, a good first approximation would be the corner solution-no liability of the remote party to the plaintiff. Actions over
under express agreement might take place, but I should regard
them as unlikely occurrences. The spirit of Hadley v. Baxendale
would penetrate to this important corner of the law: limited damage rights under contract, coupled with inspection and servicing of
equipment, is the more likely approach.
If this is correct, then the success of the old system depended in
large part upon the existence of the privity limitation on the thirdparty actions against product suppliers of all stripes and conditions. With those direct actions barred, the possibility of thirdparty actions against the employer could not arise, 96 thereby preserving the structural integrity and simplicity of the workers' compensation system. The allure of expanded torts damages is always
present, but to maintain the structure of the basic compensation
system that allure had to be resisted not only by the parties, but
also by the judges.
IV. DEGENERATION, AND REVIVAL?

This Article passes over large portions of the history of workers'
compensation to address this single question: what accounts for
the major challenges to the workers' compensation system today?
In order to answer this question, it is necessary to stress not the
strength but the one major weakness of the original legislative bargain: it was rigid and not capable of self-correction. Here, I shall
not detail the various shifts that have taken place within the compensation system but shall only point to them in the most general
132 (1980).
" The modem source of these actions is found in the important case of Dole v. Dow
Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972).
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way. The central point is that both the definition of what counts as
a compensable event and the levels of compensation awarded have
been expanded through judicial interpretation and legislative enactment in recent years. A priori, it is difficult to say whether these
changes are a good or a bad thing without knowing whether they
move with or against the dominant contractual norm. My own suspicion, judging from the present distress of the system, is that the
levels of benefits and the extent of coverage have simply become
too lavish to satisfy the elaborate set of constraints upon any compensation system, voluntary or compulsory. The large protests
from firms required to pay them-coupled with oft realized threats
either to leave the jurisdiction or to locate expansion elsewhere-are consistent with this view."'
There is, however, an incipient development that, if it obtains
general acceptance, poses a greater threat to the viability of workers' compensation. It concerns the various judicial efforts to dismantle the exclusive remedy protection that the system affords the
employer. I wish to concentrate only on one aspect of the problem-the direct tort actions brought by the employee against the
employer."8 There are two recent developments that require some
special comment. The first of these is the radical expansion of the
In Illinois, for example, the legislature sharply raised the benefit levels under the compensation system in what appeared to be an agreement between then Governor Walker and
leading labor leaders. The response to the increases was sharp, as many busines and insurance leaders complained that Illinois had become a state bad for business. See, for various
stages of the controversy, Houston, New state law on injuries at work costing millions, ChiL
Tribune, Feb. 22, 1976, § 2, at 13, col 1; Wiedrich, State laws make city's business climate
foul, Chi. Tribune, Jan. 13, 1980, § 1, at 5, col 4.
See Epstein, Coordination of Workers' Compensation Benefits with Tort Damage
Awards, 13 FORuM 464 (1978). The proposal developed in this paper did not go the full
length of blocking all third-party actions, although there is, as I have said, much to favor
that position. Instead, it sought to coordinate better the interaction of the compensation
and tort systems by (1) reducing the amount of tort recovery against a third party by the
compensation benefits paid or payable, (2) eliminating the rights, be it by lien, subrogation,
or direct action, of the employer to recoup his compensation benefits from the tort recovery
of the employee, and (3) blocking all actions for indemnity or contribution brought by the
third party against the employer, except by express agreement. The advantages of this proposal are chiefly two. First, it reduces the administrative costs of operating the system; and
second, it prevents the limited financial incentive upon the employer from being dissipated,
as it is when he recovers, regardless of his own negligence, his full compensation payments
from the third-party defendant. Note that in Epstein, supra, I addressed this scheme only
in the context of a third-party products liability action. Its application seems, however,
more general in scope.
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dual capacity doctrine. The second deals with the parallel expansion of the employer's liability for intentional harms.
A. Dual Capacity
That some case for a "dual capacity" doctrine exists is certain.
Suppose that on Sunday, A runs down B on a public street while
driving his own car. Should B's action in tort be barred because on
another day and in another place B turns out to be the employee
of A? The explicit premise of the legislative bargain is that the
compensation system extends only to those accidents that arise out
of the employment relation. It is, in a word, a relationship not
merely between persons, but between persons as holders of welldefined roles. To admit the extreme case, however, carries with it
the cost of line drawing in more marginal situations. In Duprey v.
Shane,99 the plaintiff was a nurse in the employ of the defendant
chiropractor. The nurse was injured in the course of her employment, and the defendant physician, who carried compensation insurance, treated her on the same footing as his other patients. The
court held that the action for medical malpractice could proceed,
notwithstanding the exclusive-remedy provision of the compensation law, and argued that in treating his nurse the defendant had
"assumed a role distinct in both time and nature from that of an
employer."100 In my view the case is tenuous, if not wrong, for the
plaintiff did not come to the defendant qua patient with an injury
wholly unrelated to her employment. This should certainly be the
case where medical care is provided as part of the ordinary course
of the employer's business, without any additional charge to the
employee. In the typical case of on-the-job medical treatment and
even in Duprey itself, it seems better to regard the treatment as a
continuation of the employment relationship that is accordingly
covered by workers' compensation.
To be sure, the integrity of the compensation system could survive if the erosion of the exclusive-remedy provision were limited
to the occasional case where an individual employer was treating
his own employee. 101 Matters, however, take on a more ominous
39 Cal. 2d 781, 249 P.2d 8 (1952).

100 Shook v. Jacuzzi, 59 Cal. App. 3d 978, 980, 129 Cal. Rptr. 496 (1976) (discussing

Duprey).
'0" See 2A A. LARSON, supra note 5, § 72.61(c) (urging that the doctrine be "confined to
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appearance if the dual capacity doctrine can routinely overwhelm
the exclusive-remedy defense in all employment cases. The linguistic trick behind this massive institutional transformation is easy to
see. Dual capacity properly applies when A and B are brought together only in some relation wholly separate from that of employer
and employee. This is worlds apart from the case where they are
brought together in some relationship in addition to that of employer and employee.
Just this fatal step was taken in the ill-considered case of Bell v.
Industrial Vangas, Inc.10 2 There the plaintiff was a route salesman
for the defendant and was responsible for the delivery of natural
gas to the defendant's various customers. The plaintiff was injured
by a fire that occurred during the course of one of those deliveries.
There could be no serious doubt that plaintiff was entitled to
workers' compensation. The only question was whether the benefits so recovered represented the ceiling, or only the floor, of his
rights against his employer. To convert the system into a floor
only, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant engaged in the manufacture, packaging, and selling of the natural gas in question and
therefore was covered by the California law of products liability,
which concededly would have applied if the plaintiff had not been
an employee of the company. The case therefore raised anew the
fundamental challenge of the integration of two separate systems
of liability, each with its own history and doctrinal base.
The California Supreme Court held that the products liability
rules, whose policies of accident protection and loss distribution
are so antithetical to the workers' compensation system, applied. It
therefore held that the occurrence of the accident within the
course of employment was only a "mere fortuitous circumstance"103 that did not in and of itself bar a products liability action. Yet the circumstance was not fortuitous. That the plaintiff
cases in which, as in Duprey, the employer is in the business of furnishing medical service3,
and in which the responsibility for the malpractice is personal, not vicarious."). Note that
even this concession introduces a cleavage between personal and institutional employers and
does not explain why, if ordinary treatment on the job by medical personnel is within the
scope of employment, see Dixon v. Ford Motor Co., 53 Cal. App. 3d 499, 125 Cal. Rptr. 872
(1975), matters should differ when the employer is a physician. The justification for this
view is that so long as the case is on the books, we should make the least of it.
102 30 Cal. 3d 268, 637 P.2d 266, 179 Cal. Rptr. 30 (1981).
10 Id. at 279, 637 P.2d at 273, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 37.
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was an employee keyed him into the compensation system in a way
the rest of the world was not. As the decision itself did nothing to
remove the employee's compensation benefits, it did not restore
any implicit parity between workmen and strangers. Nor is there
any reason, if this were possible, for it to be done. Whatever the
weakness of the common-employment doctrine, it recognized, as
does the workers' compensation law, that employees and strangers
fall into separate categories. Where an explicit bargain limits B's
rights of action against A, it should be respected even if C's rights
of action against A remain wholly unimpaired. A contract individuates treatment; it takes parties out of the mass of strangers. No
agreement could have any institutional function if it was valid only
if it confirmed the status quo. The legislative bargain should be
treated in the same fashion: it binds the parties to it. So long as
workers and strangers are treated differently under the compensation system, there is no reason to insist that they should be treated
in the same fashion under the tort system.
Yet in essence this is what the decision in Bell did. It takes little
imagination to see that a bit of ingenuity can extend its rationale
to cover not only the products liability actions, but also all other
forms of tort suit. The dissent in Bell was without question correct
in observing that "[i]f an employer is to be held civilly liable to
injured workers in the employer's capacity as a 'manufacturer,'
what compelling reason can exist for denying similar liability for
injuries attributable to the employer's other relationships including his status as 'landowner,' 'motor vehicle operator,' or 'cafeteria
proprietor'?" 110 The decision in Bell can be criticized forcefully on
the ground that it runs roughshod over the statutory language and
therefore judicially repeals the basic legislative design. Yet given
our analysis of the economic structure of the compensation laws,
the decision would be equally ill-conceived if introduced by an explicit legislative enactment. The principles of economic scarcity are
still at work. There is not enough value received from the individual worker to support two compensation systems. The point bears
especial force when it is noted that the negligence law of today is
vastly more favorable to the plaintiff than it was on the eve of
workers' compensation. Fellow servant is gone; contributory negligence is comparative negligence; assumption of risk is now part of
14

Id. at 287, 637 P.2d at 278, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 42 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
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comparative negligence. It is difficult to imagine any serious action
in which the plaintiff will be unable to reach the jury against the
employer if the exclusive remedy is not allowed to stand, as errors
in plant design, supervision, warnings, or whatever will always be
lurking in the background, even if not fully provable. One might
argue that these developments in the law of negligence are welcome improvements over the earlier law. Yet here there is no evidence that the modern negligence doctrines bear any relationship
to the legal rules that would be generated by voluntary transactions and every evidence that the courts that impose them would
not tolerate their removal by contractual means. The private
power to correct for judicial errors has been removed. At any rate,
a system that contemplates both the tort action against the employer and the compensation is beyond rational defense.
It is in one sense too early to determine the institutional effects
of Bell and kindred cases. In California the decision itself has already proved to be a prelude to further legislation, for a recent
statute overturns Bell, increases the overall level of compensation,
and creates, for reasons that appear wholly unprincipled, an exception to the exclusive-remedy provision for those machine tools that
are improperly installed or maintained by the employer."1 5 The
three parts of the bill have no organic unity. It is simply a reflection of how judicial trumps can be transformed into legislative
benefits. Outside of California, there have been many decisions
that have decided the question in opposite ways, 1°0 and even in
those jurisdictions where dual capacity has been expanded, subsequent judicial decisions could again limit its scope. If not, then at
the very least some corrective legislation (that does not follow the
California pattern) is needed to restore the original status quo
ante. It will not do to have one side of the legislative bargain undone with the other still in force. Nor will it do to remove both
sides of the bargain. What is needed is a return to the original conception of the system with its robust exclusive-remedy provision.
B. Intentional Torts
The second direct challenge to the exclusive remedy provision is
See Act of Sept. 10, 1982, ch. 922, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 4944 (West).
,06 See Bell and cases cited therein, 30 Cal. 3d at 287, 637 P.2d at 278, 179 Cal. Rptr. at
105
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found in the treatment of willful or intentional wrongs by the employer. Unlike ordinary negligence, intentional harms introduce an
element of moral hazard that is very difficult to control by a set of
rules designed for accidents. This point is, I. think, confirmed by
the general treatment that deliberate wrongs have received in
other contexts. 10 7 For example, a defendant who commits an inten-

tional harm cannot set up contributory negligence or plaintiff's
misconduct as a defense, and the compensation law similarly recognizes the problem by barring recovery for a worker in willful
default.
How then should the employer's intentional wrong be treated?
One possibility is to permit a direct action in the tort system, as if
the compensation laws had never been enacted. But this approach
is, I think, inferior to the alternative that, within the framework of
the compensation system, makes the employer pay some penalty
(say 150% of normal benefits) to employees that he intentionally
injures. The advantages of this approach are two. First, it keeps
the entire case within the workers' compensation system, so that
there is no need to worry about the coordination of tort and compensation actions. Second, it protects the system against the indirect erosion that occurs when the intent requirement is attenuated
to include mental states that are insufficient to support either
criminal punishment or (in a world more sensible than our own)
punitive damages.
These possibilities for direct tort actions against the employer
have borne fruit within the past several years, as recent cases have
shown a marked willingness to allow cumulative trauma actions to
be pursued against employers outside the workers' compensation
system on the ground that the injuries are intentionally inflicted.
The allegations in question are typically of two particular sorts.
The first and more general claim is that the deliberate exposure to
dangerous substances in the workplace, especially if in willful violation of statute, supports a tort action for both actual and punitive damages. The second, and narrower, position is that the improper provision of medical inspection and treatment after the
original exposure, if "falsely and fraudulently done," supports the
tort actions, again for actual and punitive damages, but only if the
deliberate conduct aggravated the original injury. The first of these
107

For my views, see Epstein, Intentional Harms, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 391 (1975).

HeinOnline -- 16 Ga. L. Rev. 814 1981-1982

1982l

WORKERS' COMPENSATION

815

positions has just been adopted by the Ohio Supreme Court in
08 The second
Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chemicals Inc.1
of these propositions was accepted by the California Supreme
Court in Johns-Manville Products Corp. v. Contra Costa Superior
Court10 9 (hereinafter Rudkin, the claimant), which, however, expressly rejected the broader proposition subsequently embraced in
Blankenship. Both of these breaches of the exclusive remedy provision should be rejected. This is clear enough on statutory
grounds, as the language was drafted to guard against this very
result. The statute to one side, the exclusive-remedy provision is
critical to the basic legal structure for industrial accidents, especially in an environment in which private agreements are
unenforceable.
In embracing the tort remedy, the Ohio court in Blankenship
started with the premise that the basic compensation bargain prevented the worker from maintaining tort actions for negligent
harms but not for those intentionally inflicted. In making this particular opposition, however, it never offered a coherent account of
what constituted an intentional wrong, although the concept is far
from self-evident. With an ordinary traumatic injury a deliberate
assault by the employer upon a worker is outside the coverage of
the workers' compensation statute, given the specific intention to
harm and the utter want of any justification or excuse for the employer's conduct. By the same token, however, an ordinary personal injury case remains within the compensation system where
the employer knows, even to a certainty, that equipment will necessarily cause harm to some workers, perhaps because it will be
defective, or ill-maintained, or housed in violation of statute. What
is at stake in all these cases is the looser form of intent-the mere
knowledge that future injury will take place as the by-product of
productive activity. One justification for the introduction of the
workers' compensation statutes was that they instituted a certain
predictable response for the "inevitable toll" of all productive activity. To take these cases out of the compensation system is to
dismantle it before it is scarcely in place; to my knowledge, at
least, no court has required that result.
Should the rules of the game change when we move from ordi10869 Ohio St. 2d 608, 433 N.E.2d 572 (1982).
109 27 Cal. 3d 465, 612 P.2d 948, 165 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1980).
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nary accident cases to cumulative trauma cases? There is no question but that the two sorts of cases are quite different. The suddenness is gone with cumulative trauma, and with it the ability to
locate the source of the accident at a single time and place. In the
early days of workers' compensation, the problem of dealing with
cumulative trauma caused by diffuse and multiple sources was regarded as so great that the cases were held as falling outside the
coverage language-"personal injury by accident"-unless it could
be shown on the model of ordinary accidents that a discrete and
sudden exposure was responsible for the identified harm. Today,
most statutes have special provisions to cover occupational diseases. But these continue to present special difficulties, especially
with workers who have changed jobs many times during their career. Here, it is difficult to identify the proper employer for any
given injury or disease, even assuming the condition itself to be
work related. And it is therefore wholly proper to adopt very strict
administrative rules to handle the coverage question, such as the
rule that locates each cumulative trauma case to the last insurer of
the last employer responsible for the condition in question.110 But
the differences created by cumulative trauma cases do not require
any other modification of the compensation system. Whatever definition of the intention was proper with ordinary personal injuries
should carry over to this new context as well. It should therefore
be wholly immaterial that the employer knew that injuries could
result from exposure to substances found in the workplace or even
that exposure levels were higher than permitted by statute. Knowledge of the first form is always present, and breaches of regulatory
duties within the compensation framework should be the source of
statutory fines and penalties only. These breaches should not have
the enormous consequence of taking a case out of the compensation system itself, by creating a private right of action in tort. It
follows, therefore, that only intentional wrongs, in the narrow
sense of deliberate infliction of harm for its own sake, can allow
tort actions against employers in the cumulative trauma area, a
rare and institutionally unimportant situation.
The California court in Rudkin recognized the force of the arguments against the position in Blankenship, but nonetheless insisted that the provision of the medical inspection program offered
"xo See, e.g.,

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 172.36 (1975).
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the plaintiffs a possible avenue of escape from the compensation
system. Again, however, the parallels to ordinary trauma cases
should be decisive. The question of medical treatment of injured
workers arises frequently in connection with ordinary accident
cases. Yet there is no reason to allow malpractice actions to be routinely brought with respect to such treatment. Instead, the proper
line is to insist that the tort action be allowed only when there is a
deliberate infliction of harm for its own sake against the worker, a
case that will typically require proof of actual malice on the part of
the treating physician. The same logic again applies with cumulative trauma cases. Wherever the inspections are conducted on a
voluntary basis, it seems very odd to tell an employer.who has reduced the expected levels of injury that he is now to be held to full
tort damages for the injuries that do in fact occur. A decision of
that sort can only penalize desirable actions and therefore make it
more likely that those actions will not be undertaken, to the detriment of the very workers whom the statute is designed to protect.
The Court in Rudkin said, and with some conviction, that the
compensation statutes should not serve as a shield for palpable
misconduct. But the response is that, unless the statute provides
that kind of a shield in all but the most extreme cases, the compensation system will lose its effectiveness in industrial accident
cases. The very fact that the plaintiffs are allowed the limited escape in Rudkin now means that both parties will have to incur the
very heavy expenses of litigation in order to determine whether the
limited cause of action stated by the plaintiff can be proved.""' All
company officials and physicians who participated in the inspection plan become fair targets for the depositions and interrogatories that so disrupt the ordinary management of the firm. The
causal issues will be difficult because the plaintiffs cannot recover
if the original exposures were sufficient to cause harm. And if the
defendants prevail on the merits, 112 it means that they will have
12 The similar problem arises in all cases of immunity. See, for example, Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2727 (1982), where the Supreme Court adopted a qualified privilege doctrine for the confidential advisers of the President, while in the same breath enjoined lower
courts to issue summary judgments for the defendant in order to stave off the possibility of

extensive litigation.

"1 On this point Rudkin goes no small way toward easing the plaintiff's burden by noting
that where it is impossible to apportion damages between those exposures that could have
been avoided with proper medical care and those that could not, the presumption should be
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been required to bear the costs of these complicated lawsuits without any protection at all. The goal of the compensation statutes
was that uncertain remedies should be replaced by certain ones, so
as to prevent litigation from becoming a grotesque imitation of
global war. Those gains to compensation can be obtained only if
the temptation is resisted to look behind the veil in individual
cases. The exception for intentional harms must be limited to its
narrowest possible scope, especially if it is sufficient to take cases
out of the compensation system and even if the plaintiff receives
an increased recovery within it. I have little doubt that under the
compensation systems developed by voluntary means these escape
provisions would not be expanded to permit suits like Rudkin to
go forward, while the outcome in Blankenship is wholly inconceivable as a contractual matter. The courts that are now engaged in
the wholesale attack upon the exclusive-remedy provision make all
too little of its institutional importance.
How then can the compensation system insulate itself from the
shocks of these similar decisions? The instinctive reaction is for
corrective legislation designed to shore up the exclusive-remedy
provision. But the current onslaught might well spur us to reconsider the foundations of the entire system. Why does workers'
compensation have to rest upon a compulsory legislative action?
Why is it not possible for it to be the outgrowth of a voluntary
arrangement? I would not be troubled with a statute that said that
in the absence of express agreement compensation benefits stipulated by statute were awarded; that in itself would represent an
enormous change from the older common law. But the statutory
schedules could be the beginning and not the end of the process. If
the legislature set the coverage formula incorrectly, it could be
changed by private agreement. And the same would be true of benefit levels. In many cases if the system as a whole proved unattractive, contracting out could be complete. 113 I do not think that we
should be troubled by this result if it is arrived at by voluntary
processes. Indeed, in an age of collective bargaining, there seems
no reason why, in the typical manufacturing context, negotiations
set in favor of full recovery of the plaintiff, even though the heavier exposures of earlier
years (not to mention smoking) likely have a greater causal significance.
"1 I have taken much the same position with respect to medical malpractice. See Epstein,
Medical Malpractice: The Case for Contract, 1976 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 87.
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over compensation cannot take place side by side with those over
wages, working conditions, and fringe benefits. Similarly, employers have incentives to supply the right mix of benefits even for a
nonunionized workforce, which typically receives all forms of
health insurance, disability pay, and life insurance. There are, of
course, questions as to whether workers would be duped or
deceived, but I think this highly unlikely in any broadscale and
durable institutional arrangement. In truth, the risks running in
the opposite direction may be far greater today. If legislatures and
courts forget the historical origins and economic structure of the
compensation statutes, they may bring about an institutional disarray that works against the interests of both the employer and the
employee.
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